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MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN AND THE CONDITION
OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
Robert M. O'Neil*
No member of the United States Supreme Court has contributed
more to establishing the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in
American law than Mr. Justice Brennan. Yet clearly the Justice did
not devise or discover the doctrine. The sources of the doctrine re-
main, in fact, relatively obscure despite the scholarly attention recently
devoted to its study and analysis.1 The first articulation of the con-
cept of unconstitutional conditions as a constraint on governmental au-
thority came during the 1920s-or perhaps even earlier.2  At first the
evolution of the doctrine was unconscious, and therefore slow and
tentative. Its application was, until quite recently, confined almost
totally to state regulation of nonresident corporations seeking to ex-
pand the scope of their business activities.' The significant cases
could be collected in a small pamphlet.
What Mr. Justice Brennan has done is to expand the doctrine
and shift its focus from corporate interests to the rights and liberties
of individuals who seek or receive government benefits. During his
years on the Supreme Court he has continually reminded his colleagues
of a most vital limitation on the excesses and abuses of governmental
power. Through a long series of decisions, involving a broad range of
government beneficiaries, Justice Brennan has articulated a set of basic
principles which compose the modem doctrine of unconstitutional con-
* Vice President and Provost for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Cincinnati. A.B. (1956), A.M. (1957), LL.B. (1961), Harvard University.
1. For general discussions of the background and development of the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions, see R. O'NEIL, Tim PRICE OF DEPENDENCY 39-57
(1970); French, Unconistitutional Conditions: An Analysis, 50 GEO. L.J. 234 (1961);
Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321
(1935); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitu-
tional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960); Comment, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions,
117 U. PA. L. REV. 144 (1968).
2. See, e.g., Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583
(1926); Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922).
3. See Comment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 144, 145-51 (1968), for a thorough review
of the older cases.
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ditions. Under his guidance, we have come a very long way indeed
from Mr. Justice Holmes' view that Officer McAuliffe "may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right
to be a policeman."4  Today, within certain broad limits, one has a
constitutional right to do both.5
A number of major Supreme Court decisions since 1956 are sig-
nificant. There are two major cases, however, to which principal at-
tention must be given, for they are the cornerstones of the doctrine.
One is Speiser v. Randall,6 coming quite early in Mr. Justice Bren-
nan's term on the Court; the other is Sherbert v. Verner,7 coming later
in his career and reflecting the maturation of his views in this area.
We must begin with the condition of the law as Justice Brennan as-
sumed his seat on the Court to see how far we have come.
I. PRELUDE TO SPEISER
Mr. Justice Holmes disposed of Officer McAuliffe in 1892.
Quaint though Holmes' views may sound today, they lingered far into
the twentieth century. Incredibly, as late as 1952-sixty years after
McAuliffe-the Supreme Court, in Adler v. Board of Education," sus-
tained the New York loyalty laws9 with the callous comment that state
employees who did not like disclaimer oaths were always "at liberty to
retain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere."" The under-
lying premises were that public employment (and a fortiori other
types of government benefits) were "privileges" rather than "rights;"
since government was not legally required to provide these benefits
at all it could attach to the offer any conditons or restrictions it
wished. The "greater" power to deny the benefit outright, in other
words, presupposed the existence of a "lesser" power to restrict access
or eligibility on any basis whatever."
Two years later-a scant thirty months before Justice Brennan
4. McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
5. See Bruff, Unconstitutional Conditions Upon Public Employment: New De-
partures in the Protection of First Amendment Rights, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 129 (1969);
Note, The Public Employee and Political Activity, 3 SUFFOLK L. REv. 380 (1969).
6. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
7. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
8. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
9. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 12-a, as amended, § 150 (McKinney 1959); N.Y.
E uc. LAW § 3022 (McKinney 1970).
10. 342 U.S. at 492.
11. For a perceptive analysis and critique of the logic of the unrestricted use of
the conditioning power, see French, supra note 1.
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took his seat-the Court, in Barsky v. Board of Regents,'2 upheld by
a 6-3 decision the power of New York State to suspend the license of
a physician for refusing to produce documents demanded by the
House Un-American Activities Committee. The rationale was more
revealing than the decision:
The practice of medicine in New York is lawfully prohibited
by the State except upon the conditions it imposes. Such practice
is a privilege granted by the State under its substantially plenary
power to fix the terms of admission. 13
Today, of course, it is easy to see how right Justice Douglas was when
he remarked, in dissent, that "nothing in a man's political beliefs dis-
ables him from setting broken bones or removing ruptured appendixes,
safely and efficiently."' 4  But to get the perspective of the time, it is
noteworthy to recall that Chief Justice Warren voted with the majority;
Justice Frankfurter was the third dissenter.
These and other cases indicate how pervasive was the vicious
impact of McCarthyism in the mid-1950s. Though the Senator's
fangs had been clipped somewhat, the venom was still there-as Jus-
tice Brennan himself was to find during the intense cross-examination
by Senator McCarthy at the confirmation hearings in the fall of 1956.
(Since these hearings took place during the pendency of several cases
squarely implicating the authority of Congress to investigate subversive
activities,'" McCarthy was understandably eager to know where Bren-
nan stood. In a remarkable display of courage and conviction, the
Justice firmly refused to divulge his views on any of the cases then be-
fore the Court. He would go no further than to offer general views
on public policy questions. Not only his own dignity but also the in-
tegrity of the Court as an institution were on trial that day.)
The several internal security cases in the mid-1950s did little to
improve the status of government beneficiaries.1 6 Essentially, the law
remained little changed from the rule that Justice Holmes had enunci-
ated in the '90s. One loyalty oath had been ruled invalid on a rather
technical ground, but the vice was so patent that little could be ex-
12. 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
13. Id. at 451.
14. id. at 474.
15. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). Also pending, though
not yet argued, were Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); and Watkins
v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
16. But see Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350
U.S. 497 (1956).
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trapolated from the decision.' 7  Meanwhile, the Court had sustained
several oaths, disclaimers, qualifications and the like essentially on the
grounds reflected in the Adler and Barsky decisions cited earlier.
While the Warren Court had already spoken with great force on the
matter of school segregation and other dimensions of civil rights,",
remarkably little had been done to protect civil liberties before the
1956 Term.
II. SPEISER V. RANDALL: A MODEST START
Early in Justice Brennan's second Term, a group of cases brought
to the Court a California law requiring claimants for certain property
tax exemptions to submit loyalty affidavits. 19 The California constitu-
tion"° made the exemption unavailable to persons and organizations
who advocated the violent overthrow of the Government of the United
States or of the State; the legislature had required the declaration of
non-support as the mechanism for determining eligibility. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court had consistently upheld the tax exemption pro-
visions2 ' on the theory that the state's interest "in protecting its revenue
raising from subversive exploitation"22  sufficed to validate the pro-
cedure, and by analogy to public employee oaths consistently upheld by
the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1950s. Justice Traynor, with the con-
currence of Chief Justice Gibson, found the exemption requirement both
substantively and procedurally deficient.2 3 Justice Carter went even
further, perceiving this case as a vehicle for a broadside attack on the
whole concept of loyalty-security oaths and tests. 24
By the time the issue reached the U.S. Supreme Court, in Speiser
v. Randall,2 5 the whole range of argument had thus been laid bare by
the California Justices. If the exemption procedure was to be inval-
idated, three options were available. The Court could have met the
17. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
18. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 32 (West 1970).
20. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 19.
21. See, e.g., First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles, 48 Cal. 2d 419,
311 P.2d 508 (1957).
22. Id. at 438, 311 P.2d at 519.
23. Id. at 443, 311 P.2d at 522 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 466, 311 P.2d at 537 (Carter, J., dissenting).
25. Although the principal case in the California courts involved tax exemption
claims for church groups, the vehicle for decision in the Supreme Court was a case
involving eligibility of a non-signing World War II veteran. This case played a quite
minor role in the California courts, being decided on the authority of the church-
exemption case.
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issue head on, as the California dissenters had done, and held that
states lacked power to deny tax exemption to non-oath takers. While
such a bold position would probably by this time have commanded
four votes-Brennan, Warren, Black and Douglas-the availability of
the necessary fifth vote would have been extremely doubtful. Unless
one member of the Court's conservative wing had been willing to dis-
tinguish taxpayers from other government beneficiaries, that route
must have seemed closed.
There was a second alternative which might well have com-
manded a majority. In earlier cases, the Court had suggested that
where less onerous or less restrictive means existed for the achieve-
ment of even a valid governmental objective, those means must be
used in place of measures that curtailed speech or expression.26 (Two
years later the Court was to invoke this rationale explicitly in striking
down an Arkansas public employee reporting requirement.) 2 7 California
did have alternative ways of serving its constitutional goal; it might, for
example, have accepted a single affidavit by each taxpayer as conclusive
rather than requiring the declaration to be renewed on each year's tax
form. Yet the impact of such a decision would have gone little beyond
the facts of the unique California tax exemption procedure. Extrapola-
tion to other restrictions on other governmental beneficiaries would have
been problematical.
Discarding these two options, what Justice Brennan presumably
sought instead was a rationale that would bring the Court together
for reversal, and, at the same time, allow articulation of a principle
going well beyond the facts of the case. The key to this objective lay
not in substance but in procedure-the way in which the loyalty re-
quirement shifted to the taxpayer not only the initial responsibility to
file the annual declaration, but also the entire burden of proof through-
out any inquiry into the claimant's loyalty. Thus, while a state might
have constitutional power to deny exemptions to disloyal persons, and
even to require some declaration of loyalty, it could not go as far as
California had gone in placing upon the claimant the entire burden of
proving his loyalty when challenged. Justice Brennan stated the posi-
tion of the Court:
Where the transcendent value of speech is involved, due process
certainly requires in the circumstances of this case that the
26. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938). For the development of this
concept as a limitation on governmental power, see generally Wormuth & Mirkin,
The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. REv. 254 (1964).
27. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
[Vol. 4:5 8
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State bear the burden of persuasion to show that the appellants
engaged in criminal speech. The vice of the present procedure
is that, where particular speech falls close to the line separating
the lawful and the unlawful, the possibility of mistaken factfind-
ing-inherent in all litigation-will create the danger that the
legitimate utterance will be penalized. 28
Two central premises emerged from the Speiser opinion. The
first was a heightened solicitude for procedure in the first amendment
area. No portion of the opinion has been more often cited than the
passage warning that "[t]he separation of legitimate from illegitimate
speech calls for more sensitive tools than California has supplied"2 9-
reflecting the premise that "the line between speech unconditionally
guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated, suppressed,
or punished is finely drawn."3 In countless cases since Speiser, these
phrases have been quoted as the basis for a holding that procedures
adequate for other purposes were too crude for first amendment judg-
ments and hence unconstitutional."'
The second major contribution of Speiser was the rediscovery
and new application of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
Without using the terminology or citing any of the old cases involving
nonresident corporations, Justice Brennan unmistakably invoked the
concept when he held that government may not arbitrarily restrict
access to a benefit which it is under no duty to create. For the first
time in the context of individual rights and liberties, it was made
clear that calling something a "privilege" did not immunize its alloca-
tion from judicial review. For the first time, too, it was clear that a
"greater" power to deny outright did not always include a "lesser"
power to offer upon demeaning or chilling conditions, at least where
constitutional freedoms might be jeopardized.
The case was an ideal vehicle for the announcement of these
principles. The benefit involved-a small tax exemption-was one
over which the need for governmental control was clearly more tenuous
than over public employment. Even the harshest critic would have to
concede that reducing a tax bill a few dollars a year is different from
putting a subversive or suspected person in a sensitive government
post. Moreover, the claimant in Speiser-a World War II veteran-
28. 357 U.S. at 526 (citation omitted).
29. Id. at 525.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965); Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963);
Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 733 (1961).
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was one whose claim to the exemption was unusually strong and
whose loyalty could least readily be impugned. Thus the Court had
selected for its decision a case in which the California statute appeared
weakest-indeed, almost foolish-in requiring that the taxpayer prove
his loyalty every April 15.
Speiser was also an appropriate vehicle because the point of en-
try was procedure rather than substance. Justice Brennan master-
fully distinguished the two, reserving various questions about loyalty-
security programs the Court was not ready to decide (and indeed did
not decide until almost a decade later). Also the particular element
of procedure on which the decision turned derived impeccable support
from non-controversial contexts-criminal law, corporate law, evi-
dence and other settings where courts had insisted upon a fair alloca-
tion of the burden of proof. To dispute the majority judgment,
therefore, one would have had to challenge unexceptionable principles
or take issue with the Court on the facts.
Before leaving Speiser, several limitations should be noted. Be-
cause of the alignment of the Court, Justice Brennan had to make
three concessions. First, he did not decide whether California could
deny a government benefit to a person or organization that advocated
the violent overthrow of the Government or the support of a foreign
government against the United States in the event of hostilities.
(The California courts had already narrowed the reach of these
provisions to exempt mere "belief" in violent overthrow, and state at-
torneys arguing the case further conceded that mere "abstract doc-
trine" would not be proscribed.)32 In a curious way, the blurring of
this issue was essential to the Brennan rationale; if government clearly
lacked the power to achieve by direct means the end sought, then the
whole discussion of the conditioning power would have seemed gratu-
itous. Thus constitutional theory blended with practical exigency to
justify this partial concession.
Secondly, the Court in Speiser appeared to recognize priorities
among benefits and beneficiaries. The State had argued for the as-
similation of veterans and other covered taxpayers to public employees
and union officials for whom loyalty oaths had been required with
the Court's approval. 3  The Brennan opinion drew a clear distinction,
however; where "a union official or public employee may be deprived
32. 357 U.S. at 519 & n.4.
33. See, e.g., Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); American
Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
[Vol. 4:58
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of his position and thereby removed from the place of special danger,
the State is powerless to erase the service which the veteran has ren-
dered his country; though he be denied a tax exemption, he remains
a veteran."34  Strongly implied is a difference in the scope of state
power over the loyalty of different classes or types of government bene-
ficiaries.
This impression was confirmed by the third concession-the cita-
tion with apparent approval of the public employee and labor union
loyalty cases.3 5 Toward the end of the opinion, Justice Brennan sug-
gested that the Congressional objectives in the latter cases were
"thought sufficiently grave to justify limited infringement of political
rights"; that "[e]ach case concerned a limited class of persons in or
aspiring to public positions by virtue of which they could, if evilly
motivated, create serious danger to the public safety;" and that
"[t]he principal aim of those statutes was not to penalize political be-
liefs but to deny positions to persons supposed to be dangerous be-
cause the position might be misused to the detriment of the public."3 6
There was never an unequivocal reaffirmation of the loyalty oath
cases, but a strong implication of approval. On this basis, Justice
Clark was able some years later, dissenting from the striking down of
the New York loyalty laws,3 7 to argue that "my Brother BRENNAN
himself cited [Garner v. Board of Public Works]38 with approval in
[Speiser] . . .,.
The claim is plausible, if a bit unfair. What changed in the interim,
one suspects, was not Justice Brennan's own views on the loyalty-security
issue, but the extent to which he could write those views into a majority
opinion. In Speiser, he went as far as he could-in fact, considerably
further than several colleagues who joined him realized. The opinion
was a tour de force. Its imperfections-the three concessions of which
we have spoken-can be clearly forgiven. Without those concessions,
we would not have the basic principles.
III. THE CONCEPT EXPANDED: FROM SPEISER TO SHERBERT
Soon after its decision, the Court had to distinguish Speiser.4"
34. 357 U.S. at 528.
35. Id. at 527.
36. Id.
37. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 12-a, as amended, § 150 (McKinney 1959); N.Y.
EDUC. LAW § 3022 (McKinney 1970).
38. 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
39. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 624 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
40. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
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A Washington State beer wholesaler named Cammarano claimed that
he should be able to deduct from his income tax the costs of lobbying
and publicity designed to defeat new liquor regulation laws. The
Internal Revenue Service and the lower courts had consistently ruled
against that position.4 While the case was on its way to the Su-
preme Court, Cammarano perceived some possible relevance in the
Speiser decision and pursued the analogy with much vigor. The
Court properly gave the claim short shrift. The distinction, wrote Mr.
Justice Harlan, was quite clear:
Petitioners are not being denied a tax deduction because they
engage in constitutionally protected activities, but are simply be-
ing required to pay for those activities entirely out of their own
pockets, as everyone else engaging in similar activities is required
to do under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. 42
Though Mr. Justice Brennan did not express his views separately, Mr.
Justice Douglas did-for the purpose of endorsing the decision, and
at the same time to keep open the issue whether commercial speech
might ever be entitled to First Amendment protection.43 (In 1943
the Court had held that freedom of speech and of the press did not
extend to purely mercantile expression; 44 Douglas from time to time
had second thoughts and wished to preserve options for the future.)
Cammarano's citation of Speiser served indirectly, of course, to
reaffirm the earlier precedent. Justice Harlan, who might otherwise
have wavered, was now on record as citing Speiser with approval and
explaining its applicability to penalties imposed on government bene-
ficiaries exercising first amendment freedoms. Moreover, the next
year Justice Harlan indirectly strengthened the Speiser principle in
his opinion for the Court in Flemming v. Nestor,45 a case involving
denial of social security benefits to a Bulgarian deported because of
brief Communist Party membership in the 1930s. Although the Court
rejected the deportee's claim, it did acknowledge the beneficiary's in-
terest in fair treatment. After holding that social security benefits
were not (as the district court had stated) an "accrued propery right,"
Justice Harlan went on to caution: "The interest of a covered em-
ployee under the Act is of sufficient substance to fall within the pro-
tection from arbitrary governmental action afforded by the Due Pro-
41. Id. at 505.
42. Id. at 513.
43. Id. at 513-15 (Douglas, J., concurring).
44. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
45. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
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cess Clause."4  Justice Brennan (who dissented in Nestor) would
have said it better; he would have reminded the Court that labelling
a benefit a "privilege" rather than a "right" does not define the scope
of procedural safeguards. That Justice Harlan acknowledged the
principle at all may indicate the degree to which Speiser and Cam-
merano had won his adherence.
Between 1958 and 1963, the decisions in which Speiser figured
prominently can be grouped under several headings. First, in several
cases involving freedom of the press Justice Brennan invoked Speiser's
"sensitive tools" concept. 47 The Court struck down, in 1959, Califor-
nia's obscenity law which allowed a finding of guilt with no require-
ment of knowledge.48  With explicit reference to Speiser, Justice Bren-
nan underscored the difference betwen placement of the burden of
proof in ordinary economic (and even criminal) litigation and the spe-
cial sensitivity required in the First Amendment area: ". . . where
we conceived that this device was being applied in a manner tending
to cause even a self-imposed restriction of free expression, we struck
down its application."49  That case was followed by similar citation
of Speiser in Marcus v. Search Warrant,"0 a 1961 case involving pro-
cedures for obtaining warrants to search for allegedly obscene and
pornographic materials. More interesting use of the "sensitive tools"
reference appeared in Justice Brennan's opinion in Bantam Books, Inc.
v. Sullivan.5 That case held unconstitutional Rhode Island's informal
censorship system designed to discourage book dealers from carrying
books found objectionable by the Commission to Encourage Morality
in Youth.52 In such cases as these, of course, we will never know
what impact, if any, Speiser may have had on the Court majority. For
Justice Brennan, as the author of the opinions for the Court, the debt
to Speiser was clear and substantial-just as these cases afforded him
continuing occasion to strengthen Speiser by citation.
The Speiser rationale was involved in the two bar admission cases
decided in 1961-Konigsberg v. State Bar of California" and In re
Anastaplo.54 The Konigsberg case had been before the Court once
46. Id. at 611.
47. 357 U.S. at 525.
48. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
49. Id. at 151.
50. 367 U.S. 717, 731 (1961).
51. 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963).
52. Id. at 70-7 1.
53. 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
54. 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
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before. 55 At that time the Justices sent the case back to the state
courts because it seemed the bar examiners were excluding an other-
wise qualified candidate without adequate evidence of unsatisfactory
character.-6  The California Bar reaffirmed its earlier action, finding
the exclusion warranted by the applicant's refusal to cooperate with
an inquiry into his past political activities-denying him admission, in
other words, for obstruction rather than subversion.57 In the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, Chief Justice Traynor argued forcefully that Spe-
ser now required an opposite result. A majority of his colleagues
found the analogy imperfect, however, and sustained the decision of
the Bar Examiners.58
The Supreme Court acknowledged that reliance on Speiser was
plausible. But Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, rejected
the analogy:
It would be a sufficient answer to any suggestion of the applica-
bility of that holding to the present proceeding to observe that
Speiser was explicitly limited so as not to reach cases where, as
here, there is no showing of an intent to penalize political be-
liefs.5 9
The majority did not rely solely on this distinction, however. Harlan
went on to observe that, unlike the tax exemption procedure, Califor-
nia's bar admission inquiry did not clearly place the total burden of
proof on the applicant, but only the burden of going forward with
some evidence. 60
For Justice Brennan and the other dissenters, Traynor's view of
Speiser was clearly correct. "Under our decision in Speiser," Bren-
nan argued, "the Fourteenth Amendment therefore protects Konigsberg
from being denied admission to the Bar for his refusal to answer the
questions . . . . And, unless mere whimsy governs this Court's de-
cisions in situations impossible rationally to distinguish, such a pro-
cedure is indeed constitutionally required here."' To the author of
the Speiser opinion, the attempt of the Konigsberg majority to escape
its "controlling authority" was patently "specious." 62  In the compan-
55. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
56. Id. at 273.
57. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 52 Cal. 2d 769, 344 P.2d 777 (1959),
rev'd, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
58. 52 Cal. 2d 769, 344 P.2d 777 (1959).
59. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 54 (1961).
60. Id. at 55-56.
61. 1d. at 80-81 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 81.
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ion case of In re Anastaplo,6" Justices Black and Brennan both re-
ferred, in dissent, to what they deemed the controlling effect of Spei-
ser; in their view Illinois, like California, had illegitimately shifted the
burden of proof to the applicant to demonstrate his loyalty.64
The distinctions drawn by the majority were not wholly specious.
Speiser had been ambiguous on the matter of motive, and Harlan
quickly seized upon the ambiguity. By seeking to distinguish the case
of the California taxpayer from that of the federal loyalty oath-taker,
Justice Brennan had seemingly deferred to the judgment of Congress
in requiring government employees and labor leaders to sign dis-
claimer oaths. There were, however, two other differences between
Speiser and Konigsberg-Anastaplo that might have been invoked had
Justice Harlan felt the need for more elaborate discussion. First was
the difference among types of beneficiaries. The Brennan opinion in
Speiser strongly implied that government had a stronger interest in
keeping disloyal people from working for the state or heading labor
unions than in denying a tax exemption to veterans.65 Even Justice
Traynor was troubled by this part of the analogy. Noting the differ-
ence between the treatment of taxpayers and civil servants in the ear-
lier cases, Traynor observed: "Since an attorney is neither a public
employee nor a taxpayer seeking an exemption, we do not know how
the United States Supreme Court would resolve the constitutional issue
here."66  This distinction is plausible and, to some judges, substantial;
some years later Mr. Justice Fortas drew a related distinction, sug-
gesting that an attorney "does not have the responsibility to account
to the State for his actions" and that his duties as licensee and officer
of the court "do not carry with them a diminution, however limited,
of his [constitutional] rights. '67
There was one other possible distinction, clearly implied by Spei-
ser but not pursued by Justice Harlan. The affidavit required by the
tax exemption law was made particularly odious and onerous by its
recurrence; a taxpayer loyal one year would have to declare (and
might have to demonstrate) his loyalty all over again the next year.
One might have said in Konigsberg that admission to the bar is so
critical a step that when doubts arise about an applicant's loyalty he
63. 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
64. Id. at 111 n.8, 116 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65. 357 U.S. at 527.
66. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 52 Cal. 2d 769, 777, 344 P.2d 777, 782
(1959) (dissenting opinion).
67. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 520 (1967).
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can be asked to dispel those doubts once and for all, with the under-
standing that if anyone should question his loyalty in the future the
presumption would of course lie in his favor. Had the Konigsberg
majority sought a narrow ground on which to distinguish Speiser, this
surely would have been it. That no use was made of this factual
distinction suggests that subtlety was unnecessary, that the Harlan posi-
tion commanded a clear majority. While Speiser had by no means
been confined to its facts during this period, the attempt to extend it to
cover other types of government beneficiaries did not succeed.
One intriguing use of Speiser during this period should be re-
called. In the course of his lengthy concurring opinion in the 1963
school prayer and Bible reading cases,s Justice Brennan came to grips
with the "exemption" argument i.e. the claim that rights of dissenting
students were protected by allowing them to be excused or exempted
from religious exercises in the classroom. This contention had a super-
ficial appeal, though applicable much more to the "free exercise of
religion" issue than to the "establishment" ground on which the Court
had decided.69 After preliminary analysis, Justice Brennan suggested
that Speiser offered a further answer. Just as the Court had held that
placing the burden of proof on the taxpayer might deter clearly eligible
persons from claiming the exemption, ° so the excusal procedure might
operate-especially in view of peer group pressures upon children to
conform in group settings-to discourage use of the procedure by
those who legitimately wished to be excused.71 Here, then, was a new
element-an emphasis upon the deterrent or "chilling" aspect of the
procedures found deficient in Speiser. The use of the reference in
this context may offer two insights into Justice Brennan's own think-
ing: one, that he continued to regard Speiser as a cornerstone of con-
stitutional law, even though his colleagues had not yet accepted its
full implications; and two, that he perceived its potential relevance
for a far broader range of governmental beneficiaries than taxpayers
seeking exemptions. Before the 1962 Term of the Court ended, that
principle was to be more widely understood.
IV. THE IMPLICATION BECOMES EXPLICIT:
SHERBERT V. VERNER
South Carolina's unemployment compensation payments, like
68. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 289 (1963) (concurring opinion).
69. Id. at 288.
70. 357 U.S. at 528-29.
71. 374 U.S. at 289-90.
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those of most states, were offered only to persons deemed "available
for work. '72  Adele Sherbert had been steadily employed for some
years in a Spartanburg cotton mill. Suddenly the demand for the
product increased and the mill converted to a six-day week, expecting
its employees to be available for work on Saturday. Mrs. Sherbert, a
Seventh-Day Adventist, refused to work on Saturdays, and was dis-
charged. She sought other work in the area but found none that
would leave her Saturdays free. The problem was not simply that
communicants of her faith worshipped on Saturday, but that for Ad-
ventists, as for Orthodox Jews, labor on Saturday was forbidden. 7"
Without questioning her good faith, the Employment Security Com-
mission ruled Mrs. Shrebert ineligible for benefits, finding her not
"available for work" since she would not accommodate her schedule
to the demands of employers in the area. 74  Thus she was faced with
a harsh choice between her faith and her livelihood. Seeking relief
from the dilemma, she filed suit for a declaration of eligibility for un-
employment benefits. The state courts summarily denied her claim, 75
and the issue reached the Supreme Court in the winter of 1962-63.
Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for a majority of seven, now had an
opportunity to make explicit many of Speiser's latent premises. Three
grounds of decision were available. First, the Court might have held
that South Carolina could not discriminate in any way against Sabba-
tarians, either in the denial of benefits or in the imposition of burdens.
Only two years earlier, however, the Court had sustained the Sunday
closing laws against claims that such statutes abridged the free exer-
cise of religion and amounted to an establishment of religion.7 6 Un-
less these precedents were to be so soon overruled, that broad ground
was unavailable.
Secondly, a narrow ground was potentially open to the Court.
Like most states, South Carolina did provide an exemption for those
who worshipped (and thus declined to work) on Sunday, but none
for persons who observed a different day of rest.77 The Court might
have postponed the issue of freedom of religion by holding the distinc-
tion between Saturday and Sunday worshippers violative of the equal
72. S.C. CODE ANN. § 68-113(3) (1962).
73. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 n.1 (1963).
74. Id. at 401.
75. Sherbert v. Verner, 240 S.C. 286, 125 S.E.2d 737 (1962), rev'd, 374 U.S. 398
(1963).
76. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
77. S.C. CODE ANN. § 64-4 (1962).
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protection clause. This resolution would, however, have been unsatis-
factory on several counts; it would have failed to decide the central
constitutional issue of the case and would have risked making un-
sound equal protection law, since there was a crude rationality to the
differentiation of Saturday and Sunday worshippers.
The middle course was thus not only the one dictated by circum-
stances but the one most compatible with Mr. Justice Brennan's con-
stitutional philosophy-a philosophy cautiously advanced in Speiser
but clearly deserving of further development and reinforcement under
more auspicious conditions. Those conditions now existed, for with
the appointment of Arthur Goldberg to replace Mr. Justice Frankfurter
the Court at last had that critical fifth vote. Thus the time had come
to reveal the full implications of Speiser.
After placing the case in the context of religious freedom, Justice
Brennan stated his central premise: Although no criminal penalties
were involved, the state agency's action "forces [Mrs. Sherbert] to
choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting
benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her
religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. ' 78 Such a dilem-
ma "puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion
as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday wor-
ship."' 79  Lest there be any doubt about the constitutional significance
of that finding, Justice Brennan then rejected the profferred right-
privilege distinction: "It is too late in the day to doubt that the liber-
ties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or
placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege."8  The footnote fol-
lowing this sentence cited many pertinent lower court cases and much
of the literature concerning the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
Then followed a lengthy summary of and quotation from Speiser, serv-
ing to establish the link between the two cases and the debt of the lat-
ter to the earlier.8 '
78. 374 U.S. at 404.
79. Id.
80. Id. (footnotes omitted).
81. Id. at 404-05 n.6. A number of lower federal and state court decisions were
cited as authority for the respectability of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
Among the most persuasive, though neglected, references was an article published in
the mid-1950s by the (then) General Counsel of the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare. This article reviewed the applicability of the unconstitutional condi-
tions principle to existing conditions and restraints, including some affecting programs
at that time administered by HEW. Willcox, Invasions of the First Amendment
Through Conditioned Public Spending, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 12 (1955).
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This general discussion, however, did not decide the case. It re-
mained to determine whether some "compelling state interest ...
justifies the substantial infringement of appellant's First Amend-
ment right." 2  State officials had suggested there might be fraudulent
claims or a flood of exemption seekers if Mrs. Sherbert's plea were ac-
cepted; but the Court found in the record no corroborative evidence.
Moreover, even if there were evidence of such hazards, the "less oner-
ous alternative" principle would require the state to prove that other
methods, such as more careful investigation of doubtful claims, could
not adequately serve legitimate administrative needs. It was the ab-
sence of any such evidence that distinguished this case from the Sun-
day closing law cases, where the Court found that a valid secular ob-
jective (a uniform day of rest) could be attained only by causing some
hardship to Sabbatarians.83  Whatever one may say about the force
of this distinction, it did serve the essential and immediate function of
upholding Mrs. Sherbert's claim without overruling the Sunday law
cases. (Mr. Justice Stewart, who concurred separately, argued that
the cases could not stand together. He, like Justice Brennan, had dis-
sented from the Sunday law decisions;84 unlike Brennan, Stewart
now felt the time had come to overrule the Sunday law precedents.)
Justices Harlan and White, the only dissenters in Sherbert, clearly
perceived how far the majority had gone. 5 Like Justice Stewart, they
felt the Court had overruled the Sunday law cases without the courage
to say so. More important, they argued that the implications of
Sherbert for other benefit programs were very far reaching:
The meaning of today's holding ... is that the State must furnish
unemployment benefits to one who is unavailable for work if the
unavailability stems from the exercise of religious convictions. The
State, in other words, must single out for financial assistance those
whose behavior is religiously motivated, even though it denies
such assistance to others whose identical behavior (in this case, in-
ability to work on Saturdays) is not religiously motivated.
[We] cannot subscribe to the conclusion that the State
is constitutionally compelled to carve out an exception to its gen-
eral rule of eligibility in the present case.8 6
82. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
83. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 610 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
In Braunfeld, Justice Stewart had dissented in a brief separate opinion and had
joined the opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Id. at 610-16.
84. Id. at 616.
85. 374 U.S. at 418-23.
86. Id. at 422-23.
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The distinction may be mainly rhetorical. To the majority, the
state must not discriminate in the allocation of benefits against those
whose ineligibility reflects religious faith or belief.87 To the dissenters
the state must provide benefits for persons whose disqualifying be-
havior reflects religious conviction.88 For both wings of the Court,
Sherbert had now made explicit much that was left unstated in Speiser.
The majority that was not available for a strong articulation of the doc-
trine of unconstitutional conditions in 1958 emerged in 1963. The
bold strokes of Sherbert were the direct consequence.
V. THE FRUITS OF SHERBERT
The evolution of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has
proceeded rapidly in the years since 1963. Both in the Supreme
Court and in lower federal and state courts, the indebtedness to Sher-
bert has been substantial and direct. Two particular areas of impact
can be identified for analysis here: The gradual elimination of loyalty
and security oaths and disclaimers; and the insistence upon fair pro-
cedures for termination or suspension of government benefits.
The constitutional rights of government beneficiaries have no-
where been more significantly protected than through the invalidation
of a series of loyalty oaths and disclaimers. By 1963, the law had
changed little in this regard from the time when the court could dis-
miss the conscientious claims of the non-signer by suggesting he "re-
tain [his] beliefs and associations and go elsewhere" if he did not
wish to work for the state on its terms.89 One patently overbroad oath
law had been held unconstitutional,9" and a requirement that public
employees annually report their extracurricular activities had been
struck down on First Amendment grounds9 -- but without overruling
the earlier oath cases. It was only after Sherbert revealed a heightened
solicitude for the constitutional liberties of public employees that the
oaths began to fall.
The first case squarely to present the issue was Baggett v. Bul-
litt,92 involving a two-part Washington State loyalty law. Justice
White, an unlikely candidate to strike the first blow, wrote a bold opin-
87. Id. at 410.
88. Id. at 420.
89. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952).
90. Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
91. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
92. 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
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ion relying heavily on the Brennan precedents, notably Speiser. "The
uncertain meanings of the oaths," he began, "require the oath-taker-
teachers and public servants-to 'steer far wider of the unlawful
zone,' [citing Speiser] than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas
were clearly marked. 93  Justice White went on to articulate a central
principle about loyalty-security tests, deriving directly from Speiser
and Sherbert:
Those with a conscientious regard for what they solemnly swear
or affirm, sensitive to the perils posed by the oath's indefinite
language, avoid the risk of loss of employment, and perhaps pro-
fession, only by restricting their conduct to that which is unques-
tionably safe. Free speech may not be so inhibited. 94
The key to this judgment, of course, is Mr. Justice Brennan's
solicitude for Mrs. Sherbert's plight. To place in proper perspective
the constitutional rights of government beneficiaries, one must look
not only at the challenged constraints or requirements in isolation, but
also at the dilemma created by collision between that external force
and the beneficiary's own belief or faith. It would no longer do
(paraphrasing Justice Holmes) to say that Mrs. Sherbert has a consti-
tutional right to be a Seventh Day Adventist but no right to receive
unemployment benefits; realistically, the former without the latter was
a hollow right. To make the constitutional liberty meaningful, its ex-
ercise must not cause the forfeiture of public benefits. Under these
conditions, there is something very close to a constitutional right to
continue to receive the benefit-unless, of course, the claimant is dis-
qualified on some nonconstitutional ground.
All this may seem obvious after the fact. The point is worth de-
veloping in context of Baggett, however, for one simple reason: Jus-
tice White, who so forcefully expounded the Brennan philosophy in
1964 had been, less than a year before, one of the two dissenters in
Sherbert.95  Now he seemed to display the zeal of a convert. The
defects in the Washington oath were plain enough, and could have
been narrowly reached through the rationale of the 1960 public em-
ployee cases had Justice White been so inclined. That he rejected the
narrow approach and wrote at length about the dilemma of the con-
scientious public employee anxious to retain both his principles and
his pay suggests his complete acceptance of the Brennan philosophy.
93. Id. at 372.
94. Id. (footnote omitted).
95. 374 U.S. 398, 418 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Once the first blow had been struck, other loyalty laws fell in
fairly rapid succession. While the Supreme Court invalidated oaths
of Florida, Maryland, New York and Arizona,9 6 the lower courts fol-
lowed the lead and largely completed the task by the end of the
decade.97  The California Supreme Court, striking down the often
challenged Levering Act oath in 1967,98 relied heavily upon Justice
Brennan's decisions: "It is now well settled that . . . the government
may not condition public employment or receipt of such benefit
upon any terms that it may choose to impose, and that the power of
government to withhold benefits from its citizens does not encompass
a 'lesser' power to grant such benefits upon an arbitrary deprivation
of constitutional rights." 99  Later in the same opinion, the California
court recognized that "conditions annexed to the publicly conferred
benefit must reasonably tend to further the purposes of the govern-
ment in granting the benefit, and the utility of imposing the conditions
must manifestly outweigh the impairment of constitutional rights."1 °
While other lower courts spoke to the point with less force and convic-
tion, clearly by this time the message had been received. So far as
public employees were concerned, substantial progress had been made
by 1970 toward the recognition and protection of civil liberties. 10'
A second focus of post-Sherbert activity was the procedural right
of government beneficiaries. Writing in 1968, Professor William Van
Alstyne, long an expert on the subject of unconstitutional conditions,
puzzled about the seemingly substantive preoccupation of the courts in
96. Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971); Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S.
54 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell,
384 U.S. 11 (1966). Alone among these cases, Higginbotham was decided on a nar-
row procedural ground, suggesting that the views of the majority of the Supreme
Court had already begun to change. For a review of the 1960s, see an excellent, thor-
ough article, Israel, Elfbrandt v. Russell: The Demise of the Oath?, 1966 SuP. CT.
REV. 193.
97. E.R., Vogel v. County of Los Angeles, 68 Cal. 2d 18, 434 P.2d 961, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 409 (1967).
98. Ch. 7, § 1, [1951] Cal. Stats., 3d Ex. Sess. 1950, Vol. 1 at 15 (now CAL.
GOV'T CODE §§ 3100-09) (West Supp. 1972).
99. 68 Cal. 2d at 21, 434 P.2d at 961, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
100. Id.
101. See generally O'Neil, Public Employment, Antiwar Protest and Preinduction
Review, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1028 (1970); O'Neil, The Private Lives o1 Public Em-
ployees, 51 ORE. L. REV. 70 (1971); Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Public
Employees: A Comment on the Inappropriate Uses of an Old Analogy, 16 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 751 (1969); Comment, The First Amendment and Public Employees-An
Emerging Constitutional Right to be a Policeman?, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 409
(1968).
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this area, to the virtual exclusion of procedures. 10 2  Except for one
federal district court decision in Idaho, holding that one who refused
to sign an oath had a right to a hearing in order to explain his recalci-
trance, 03 there had been virtually no recognition of the procedural
rights. Van Alstyne appropriately posed the paradox:
If the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is sound in holding that
government may not terminate or withhold benefits according
to standards it is constitutionally forbidden to impose upon private
citizens, then it would seem to follow that a person whose status
in the public sector is threatened by administrative action should
have a right to a fair hearing to make certain that the administra-
tive action is not in fact being taken for reasons that are constitu-
tionally improper.10 4
In other words, the absence of procedural safeguards, in short, might
dilute and even destroy the recent substantive gains of government
beneficiaries. Van Alstyne's view in this area, as in others, proved to
be prophetic.
There had been one brief skirmish on procedural matters near the
close of the decade. A Mrs. Thorpe, evicted from a North Carolina
public housing project allegedly because she chaired a tenants' union,
sued to gain a hearing at which she might assert her freedom of asso-
ciation. The Supreme Court granted review of the case, 05 but before
a ruling on the merits became due, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development adopted new regulations arguably requiring the
sort of hearing Mrs. Thorpe requested. A remand to the lower court
for such further proceedings as were mandated by the new regulations
thus avoided the constitutional due process issue.' 06 Mr. Justice Doug-
las took the occasion to touch upon the issue not reached by his col-
leagues:
The recipient of a government benefit, be it a tax exemption
[citing Speiser], unemployment compensation [citing Sherbert],
public employment . . . a license to practical law . . . or a home
in a public housing project, cannot be made to forfeit the benefit
because he exercises a constitutional right.' 07
Yet even Douglas stopped short of insisting upon due process for gov-
ernment beneficiaries apart from substantive claims.
102. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
103. Heckler v. Shepard, 243 F. Supp. 841, 847-52 (E.D. Idaho 1965).
104. Van Alstyne, supra note 102, at 1453.
105. Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 385 U.S. 967 (1966).
106. Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 386 U.S. 670 (1967).
107. Id. at 678-79 (footnotes omitted).
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The procedural issue was squarely presented to the Court in the
pair of welfare-benefit termination cases argued early in the 1969
Term.' 0 8 The slate was no longer blank, even if the particular issue
was one of first impression for the Justices. The year before, Wis-
consin's wage garnishment procedure had been held unconstitutional
for failure to provide adequate pre-attachment procedures, including
a hearing.' 09 The decision was not directly on point, of course, for
the wages in question were the "property" of the recipient and not a
government benefit, a fact which the Court noted clearly in the opin-
ion.110 Closer to the mark, a number of lower courts by this time
had held that a state college or university student had a constitutional
right to a hearing before being expelled or dismissed for campus in-
fractions."' Indeed, by 1970, a welter of lower federal district court
cases had marked out detailed contours of the student's due process
interests."12  But in the government benefit fields-including public
employment-there was still no clear right to a hearing. A status
could be changed, or benefits terminated, in most cases without giving
any reason; an adverse action could be challenged on constitutional
grounds only if the agency gratuitously gave a constitutionally invalid
reason for the action.
The disposition of the welfare hearing cases was thus potentially
critical for all government benefit fields. In Goldberg v. Kelly,1" 3 a
sharply divided (5-3) Supreme Court held that due process required
some sort of hearing prior to termination." 4 Mr. Justice Brennan
again wrote for the Court. He began by analyzing the nature of the
individual's interest:
Such benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons
qualified to receive them. Their termination involves state action
that adjudicates important rights. The constitutional challenge
cannot be answered by an argument that public assistance bene-
fits are "a 'privilege' and not a 'right.' " Relevant constitutional
restraints apply as much to the withdrawal of public assistance bene-
fits as to disqualification for unemployment compensation; or to
108. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S.
280 (1970). See generally O'Neil, Of Justice Delayed and Justice Denied, 1970
Sup. Cr. REv. 161.
109. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
110. Id. at 339.
111. See, e.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
112. See generally Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027
(1969).
113. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
114. Id.
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denial of a tax exemption; or to discharge from public employ-
ment.11
5
The definition of these interests did not, however, decide the case. It
remained to derive a right to due process in the form of a pretermina-
tion hearing. Primary emphasis was placed upon the special plight of
the welfare recipient in jeopardy: "The same governmental interests
that counsel the provision of welfare, counsel as well its uninterrupted
provision to those eligible to receive it .. ."I" Since by definition the
recipient "lacks independent resources, his situation becomes immedi-
ately desperate."117  Moreover, several asserted countervailing interests
were unpersuasive to the Court. While additional administrative ex-
pense and time might be required, the state's interest in efficiency and
economy did not outweigh the individual's interest in survival.
The next year Mr. Justice Brennan wrote once again for the
Court, recognizing the right to a hearing of another class of benefi-
ciaries-holders of drivers' licenses. In Bell v. Burson,' 8 the Court
noted the essentiality of licenses for many who drive for a living,
thereby analogizing the continued possession of a driving permit to
the continuous receipt of welfare by the indigent person. In holding
that due process required some opportunity for a hearing prior to revo-
cation or cancellation of a license, Mr. Justice Brennan observed:
This is but an application of the general proposition that relevant
constitutional restraints limit state power to terminate an entitle-
ment whether the entitlement is denominated a 'right' or a 'privi-
lege.' [citing Sherbert and Speiser among other cases.]119
The course of decisions in this area had been selective and ad hoc. It
was clear, for example, that hearings were required before attaching
wages, terminating welfare payments, cancelling a driver's permit, and
presumably before expelling a state college student. The status of
other forms of government benefits remained in doubt. The Court
was still disinclined to announce a general philosophy or principle to
cover the field.
Along the way, two collateral uses of Speiser and Sherbert should
be noted. When the majority of the Court struck down on broad sub-
stantive grounds a defense-facility clearance procedure,2 0 Mr. Justice
115. Id. at 262 (citations omitted).
116. Id. at 265.
117. Id. at 264.
118. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
119. Id. at 539.
120. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
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Brennan concurred specially on a somewhat narrower theory. To him
the case was governed by Speiser and other procedural precedents,
since the government had failed to provide adequate opportunity to
appeal an administrative designation that triggered the mechanism.' 2 '
Again in 1970, the Justice invoked Speiser to challenge a judgment of
the majority that New York could demand certain associational data
from applicants for admission to the bar.' 22 For him and for Justice
Marshall the issue was the same one that he (along with Justices
Black and Douglas) had fought and lost in Konigsberg and Anas-
taplo: "Difficulties in proving the innocence of conduct may deter
protected activity as much as a substantive standard that burdens
privileged activity by its terms."' 23
One further group of decisions during the 1960s bear brief men-
tion. Increasingly the Court invoked Speiser and Sherbert as support
for the general proposition that claims to receive government benefits
may not be dismissed by labelling the benefit a "privilege" rather than
a "right." Such references became important in the 1969 decision
invalidating the state "waiting period" or residence qualification for
welfare eligibility, 2 4 and two years later in the sequel which struck
down state denial of welfare to aliens.12 5 In the latter case, Mr. Jus-
tice Blackmun (another unlikely candidate for conversion) seemed to
accept the full implications of the Brennan philosophy of unconstitu-
tional conditions. He began by arguing that the "special public in-
terest" doctrine-under which benefits had often been withheld from
aliens-"was heavily grounded on the notion that '[w]hatever is a
privilege, rather than a right, may be made dependent upon citizen-
ship.' "26 He offered his answer:
But this Court now has rejected the concept that constitutional
rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized
as a 'right' or as a 'privilege' [citing Sherbert and its progeny.] 127
On the basis of these decisions, one might have assumed the
principle of unconstituional conditions to be so fully accepted by the
121. Id. at 272-73 (Brennan, J., concurring).
122. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154
(1971).
123. Id. at 189, n.5.
124. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
125. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
126. Id. at 374, quoting People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 164, 108 N.E. 427, 430
(1915).
127. Id.
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Supreme Court that nothing could shake its grasp. This optimism,
however, would have been premature.
VI. DARKENING CLOUDS: THE EROSION
OF THE PRINCIPLE
Even when its hegemony was clearest, the Warren Court always
stopped short of making comprehensive pronouncements about the
rights of government beneficiaries as a class. There was at least an
inference that certain beneficiaries would fare better than others.
There was also a hint, even in the most sympathetic decisions, that
certain beneficiary interests were entitled to greater protection than
others. During the '60s, however, the Court articulated no explicit
hierarchy of beneficiaries or interests.
Delineation of claims first began to emerge in the welfare hearing
cases. To explain the special claim of the welfare client, Justice
Brennan chacterized welfare payments as "a matter of statutory en-
tiflement"I 2"-thus implying a disparagement of benefits less explicitly
secured by legislative action. He went on to suggest that "[rielevant
constitutional restraints" applied at least as much to welfare as to other
contexts (public employment, tax exemptions and unemployment com-
pensation) where the Court had vindicated beneficiary interests. The
next step was a judgment that constitutional safeguards applied even
more clearly to the welfare recipient than to others:
the crucial factor in this context-a factor not present in the case
of the blacklisted government contractor, the discharged government
employee, the taxpayer denied a tax exemption, or virtually anyone
else whose governmental entitlements are ended-is that termina-
tion of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may
deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while
he waits.' 29
This passage unmistakably implied a hierarchy of interests and
claims. It seems doubtful that Justice Brennan would have taken this
approach in Kelly unless circumstances made it mandatory. His own
philosphy of unconstitutional conditions, from Speiser to Sherbert and
beyond, has stressed the assimilation rather than the differentiation of
those who receive or seek benefits from government. Speaking only
for himself, he would not have held government to a lower standard
in dealing with its employees than in dealing with welfare clients.
128. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
129. Id. at 264.
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Thus one must conclude that the apparently hierarchical approach
was essential to bring or keep a majority of the Court together. Had
the Justice insisted that a prior hearing, or any hearing at all, for that
matter, would be equally assured to all government beneficiaries, criti-
cal votes might well have been lost and with them the opportunity to
establish a vital principle of due process.
In Kelly, as in Speiser, Justice Brennan therefore sacrificed the
broad penumbra of the decision in order to hold the center. Conces-
sions at the periphery were necessary to preserve the core. Where
Speiser appeared to concede the validity of the oath cases--decisions
which Justice Brennan later effectively overruled-Kelly appeared to
establish greater rights for welfare clients than for civil servants. Just
as the majority was not yet ready to go as far as Brennan would have
wished to lead them in 1958, so the majority had begun to pull back,
to slip away from him, by 1970.
Any doubts about the precarious quality of the Kelly majority
are put to rest by appraising the context. In other recent cases, the
Court has shown itself considerably less generous to the claims of gov-
ernment beneficiaries than before.130 These decisions suggest, in fact,
that Kelly may have gone the way it did only because procedural
claims were involved; during the same Term the Court dealt some-
what less sympathetically with the substantive concerns of welfare
clients.' 3 ' Indeed, in recent cases the Court has begun to imply a dou-
ble standard for substance and procedure in the government benefi-
ciary setting.13 2
The clearest evidence of an eroding majority came in Wyman v.
James,1"' a year after Kelly. There the Court held that a welfare re-
cipient's benefits could be terminated for refusing to allow a caseworker
to enter the home for regular inspections.' 34 The majority's approach
to the constitutional claims of privacy went well beyond the immediate
question of the case. When the recipient argued that requiring her
to open her doors to the caseworker imposed an unconstitutional con-
130. See, e.g., Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972), the first case argued and
decided on the merits which sustained the constitutionality of a state loyalty oath
since the early 1950s.
131. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), upholding state "maxi-
mum grants" or "flat grants" as ceilings on family welfare payments.
132. See, e.g., Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971).
133. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
134. Id. at 326.
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dition on welfare, Mr. Justice Blackmun replied that the situation was
analogous to that of a taxpayer who refused to produce proof of chal-
lenged deductions and thus had to pay a higher income tax. "So here
Mrs. James has the 'right' to refuse the home visit, but a consequence
in the form of cessation of aid, similar to the taxpayer's resultant addi-
tional tax, flows from that refusal. The choice is entirely hers, and
nothing of constitutional magnitude is involved."'"
Justice Blackmun's view of Mrs. James and her privacy is strik-
ingly reminiscent of Justice Holmes' view of Officer McAuliffe and his
politics.' 36 The dissenters in James immediately perceived the grave
implications of this judgment for the Speiser-Sherbert framework and
the whole concept of unconstitutional conditions. Justice Douglas ar-
gued with concern:
If it was unconstitutional in Speiser to condition a tax exemption
on a limitation of freedom of speech, it was equally unconstitu-
tional to withhold a social security benefit conditioned on a limita-
tion of freedom of association. [The reference is to Flemming
v. Nestor, 37 the case of the deported Bulgarian Communist dis-
cussed earlier.] A right-privilege distinction was implicitly re-
jected in Speiser and explicitly rejected in Sherbert. Today's de-
cision when dealing with a state statute joins Flemming as an
anomaly in the cases dealing with unconstitutional conditions. 38
In a separate dissent, Mr. Justice Marshall, joined by Mr. Justice Bren-
nan, echoed the alarm:
In [Sherbert,] this Court did not say 'Aid merely ceases. There is
no abridgement of religious freedom.' Nor did the Court say in
[Speiser] . . . 'The tax is simply increased. No one is compelled
to relinquish First Amendment rights." 39
These concerns were certainly warranted by the language if not
the precise holding of the James majority. Indeed, Mr. Justice White
-never an unqualified supporter of unconstitutional conditions de-
spite his strong Baggett opinion-refused to join that part of the
Blackmun opinion which dealt with this issue and analogized Mrs.
James to an aggrieved income taxpayer. While the majority had not
gone the full distance back to the archaic and insensitive language of
the early '50s, the partial reversion was apparent to all.
135. Id. at 324.
136. See n.4, supra, and accompanying text.
137. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
138. 400 U.S. at 329-30, n.8 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 345 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
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CONCLUSION
This is an uneasy time to be writing about unconstitutional con-
ditions. In 1959 or so, we could have said that Justice Brennan had
propounded a vital new doctrine which, if carried to its full potential,
would bring a new measure of justice and dignity to persons who de-
pend upon government aid or support. In the middle of the last
decade, after Sherbert and the earliest oath cases, one would have
recognized the very substantial fulfillment of that potential-a virtual
revolution in the status of recipients of public largesse or employment.
Writing in 1970, after Kelly, one would have sensed trouble in the
offing-not because the case came out as it did but because Justice
Brennan felt compelled to make concessions of a kind he had not
made since 1958. These concessions are not like the Justice. In
this area, as much as any other, he has been a fighter deeply com-
mitted to principle. He has never lost an opportunity to press for bet-
ter safeguards for government beneficiaries. It is for precisely this
reason that in 1970, as in 1958, at the end of the cycle as at the begin-
ning, the Justice settled for less than he would have liked. But the
basic and central principle is unsullied in the process. Government
beneficiaries are no less in his debt because his sense of justice and
humanity is tempered with pragmatism.
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